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DLD-329        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4564 
___________ 
 
LEROY FEARS, 
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DR. JEFFREY A. BEARD, Ph. D., Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections; MR. LOUIS S. FOLINO; MR. SMITH, (First Name Unknown), Corrections 
Officer; MR. GRIM (First Name Unknown), Corrections Officer; MR. VICTOR 
SANTOYO, Corrections Officer, each Defendant is sued individually and within his 
Official capacity 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-10-cv-00315) 
District Judge:  Honorable Terrence F. McVerry 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 11, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 25, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
  
2 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Leroy Fears, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court‟s orders 
granting the defendants‟ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will summarily affirm.   
I. 
 The facts being well-known to the parties, we set forth only those pertinent to this 
appeal.  Fears is confined in the Capital Housing Unit at SCI-Greene, due to his sexual 
assault and murder of a twelve year old boy.  The Capital Housing Unit is a Level 5 
housing unit.  All Level 5 inmates are handcuffed on their way to and from the exercise 
yard for security and safety reasons.  Defendant Smith, one of the yard officers, 
handcuffed Fears before he returned to his cell.  According to Fears, Smith made his right 
handcuff so tight that he was in excruciating pain.  Fears, however, did not tell Smith.  He 
told defendant Grim, a sergeant, that his cuffs were too tight, but did not say that he was 
in pain.  Grim inspected the cuffs and did not observe any injury.  Fears was then 
escorted to his cell by two other officers.  He did not mention anything to them about 
being in pain.   
Fifteen minutes after Fears returned to his cell, Grim asked him if he needed 
medical attention.  Fears did not respond, and Grim left the area.  Later, Fears started 
experiencing pain in his right wrist and he was seen by two nurses.  The medical report 
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from that visit stated that he had a superficial scratch on his right wrist, which was treated 
with antibiotic ointment and a bandage.   
Fears then filed a grievance pertaining to the incident.  Defendant Santoyo 
conducted an investigation and concluded that no excessive force was used when Fears 
was handcuffed.  Defendant Folino affirmed the denial of Fears‟ grievance.   
 Fears filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his 
rights under the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments.  After most of those claims were 
dismissed, (Dkt. Nos. 21, 67), the defendants moved for summary judgment on Fears‟ 
remaining claims of excessive force and failure to intervene, (Dkt. Nos. 95-97).  The 
District Court granted their motion (Dkt. No. 117) and Fears timely appealed (Dkt. No. 
119). 
II. 
 Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily affirm the 
District Court‟s judgment if the appeal presents no substantial question.  3d Cir. L.A.R. 
27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
 We turn first to the District Court‟s dismissal of Fears‟ claims.1  We exercise 
plenary review over an order dismissing claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
                                              
1
 Fears originally filed his complaint in state court.  Because he failed to effectuate proper 
service, defendants never answered his complaint, and only learned of it after he filed a 
motion for a default judgment.  The case was then removed to federal court, and the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) moved for dismissal due to lack of 
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12(b)(6).  Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008).  “Reviewing such an 
order, we accept as true all allegations in the plaintiff‟s complaint as well as all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we construe them in a light most 
favorable to the non-movant.”  Id. (citation omitted).  A complaint must contain “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  This pleading standard “does not require „detailed factual allegations,‟ 
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 
accusation.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).  “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual 
matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Id.; see 
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (explaining that a plaintiff must “identify[] facts that are 
suggestive enough to render [his claim] plausible.”)  “[O]nly a complaint that states a 
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.   
 The District Court properly dismissed Fears‟ Eighth Amendment claim against 
Grim based on a delay in medical care.  Such a claim required a showing that Grim was 
deliberately indifferent to Fears‟ serious medical needs.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
104 (1976).  Deliberate indifference can be shown by a prison official “intentionally 
                                                                                                                                                  
proper service and because it was not a “person” for purposes of § 1983.  For 
substantially the same reasons given by the District Court, (Dkt. No. 21, pp. 3-4), the 
claims against the DOC were properly dismissed.     
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denying or delaying access to medical care . . . .”  Id. at 104-05.  The District Court 
assumed, for the sake of argument, that Fears was suffering from a serious medical need.  
(Dkt. No. 67, p. 9.)  However, it determined that his factual allegations were insufficient 
to state a plausible claim as to Grim‟s deliberate indifference.  We agree.  Fifteen minutes 
after Fears returned to his cell, Grim asked him if he needed medical attention, and Fears 
did not respond.  (Dkt. No. 1-2, ¶ 16.)  Further, Fears admitted that he was unaware of his 
injury until after Grim left his cell.  (Id. ¶ 18.)  Grim could not have known that Fears 
needed medical attention, let alone have intentionally delayed his access to it.
2
    
 We agree with the District Court‟s dismissal of Fears‟ claims arising under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Fears alleged that he was denied the right to petition 
the government for redress of grievances under the First Amendment, and that he was 
denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by the prison grievance procedures.  
Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures.  See, e.g., 
Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases).  Nor do they 
have a liberty interest protected by the due process clause in the grievance procedures.  
See Antonelli v. Sheehan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996) (state‟s inmate grievance 
procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause).  In 
                                              
2
 We also agree that Fears failed to state a plausible claim for relief with respect to his 
allegations that the administrative grievance process somehow subjected him to cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.  (Dkt. No. 67, p. 11.) 
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any event, Fears was not deprived of any process here.  He admits that he availed himself 
of the prison grievance procedures.  Fears may not agree with the outcome of his 
grievance, but his complaints were aired and assessed by the appropriate officials.   
 The District Court also properly dismissed Fears‟ claims against Folino and 
Santoyo.  Fears alleged that their handling and denial of his administrative grievance 
violated his First Amendment rights.  In order for liability to attach under § 1983, a 
plaintiff must show that a defendant was personally involved in the deprivation of his 
federal rights.  See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (defendant 
in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability 
cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior).  Fears‟ claims 
against Folino and Santoyo were based solely on their involvement in the administrative 
grievance process, in which he had no constitutional rights.  Therefore, his allegations 
were insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief.
3
  Finally, to the extent Fears 
attempted to assert his claims as violations of substantive due process, the District Court 
correctly dismissed them under the “more-specific provision rule” explained in United 
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997).  (Dkt. No. 67, pp. 15-16.)   
 We turn now to the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  We exercise plenary review and “employ the same standard as applied 
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 The claims against Beard were also properly dismissed because Fears did not allege any 
facts pertaining to him.  (Dkt. No. 67, p. 13.)   
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below.”  DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  That is, “[t]he court shall 
grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a).  “In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, we must affirm if the record 
evidence submitted by the non-movant is merely colorable or is not significantly 
probative.”  DeHart, 390 F.3d at 267-68 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).      
 The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on Fears‟ 
claim that Smith used excessive force against him while handcuffing him in the yard.  
Specifically, the District Court determined that Fears‟ allegations, taken as true, only 
established the de minimis use of force, which is insufficient to state a claim of excessive 
force under the Eighth Amendment.
4
  (Dkt. No. 114, p. 7.)  We agree.  See Smith v. 
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment does not protect an 
inmate against an objectively de minimis use of force).  The “pivotal inquiry” in an 
excessive force claim is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain . . . 
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”  Id. p. 649.  The record does 
not reflect that Fears was handcuffed for any reasons other than institutional safety and 
security.    
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 In his argument in support of his appeal, Fears does not point out any specific facts that 
would create a genuine issue and cause us to find that summary judgment was 
improvidently granted. 
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 We also agree with the District Court that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact pertaining to Fears‟ failure to intervene claim against defendant Grim.  (Dkt. No. 
114, pp. 9-11.)  An officer‟s failure to intervene can be the basis of an Eighth 
Amendment violation under § 1983 if the officer, upon witnessing another‟s use of 
excessive force against a prisoner, “had a reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply 
refused to do so.”  Smith, 293 F.3d at 650.  However, an officer is only liable “if there is 
a realistic and reasonable opportunity to intervene.”  Id. at 651.  Given Fears‟ failure to 
show that Smith used excessive force when handcuffing him, his failure to intervene 
claim must fail.  Regardless, Grim inspected Fears‟ cuffs when he complained in the yard 
and did not observe any injury that would have justified removing them before Fears 
returned to his cell minutes later.   
III. 
 There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily 
affirm.  3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6 
 
